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ON SEMIOTICS AND EDUCATION
A “semiotic approach” to education, that is an educational approach that draws from semiotics, cannot consist in 
the mere amalgamation of a semiotic theory and an educational one. In this article, I argue that the manner in which 
semiotics can contribute to education is mediated by the epistemological assumptions that underpin educational 
theories and the extent to which those assumptions can be cast in, and even be transformed by, semiotic concepts 
and constructs. After discussing the epistemic role of signs in two major epistemological theories (Leibniz’s and 
Piaget’s), I present an example of a semiotic approach to education that I illustrate around a classroom teaching-
learning episode.
Une perspective didactique qui cherche à inclure des idées sémiotiques ne peut pas se limiter à effectuer une amalgamation 
d’une théorie sémiotique et d’une théorie didactique. Dans cet article, je suggère que la manière dont la sémiotique peut 
contribuer à la recherche en didactique est conditionnée par les supposés sur lesquels s’appui l’approche didactique elle-
même et par les possibilités d’exprimer (voire transformer) ces présupposés à l’aide de concepts sémiotiques. Dans la 
première partie de l’article, ain de montrer la complexité de la problématique sous-jacente à l’articulation de sémiotique et 
didactique, je m’arrête sur le rôle épistémique des signes. Pour ce faire, j’examine deux théories épistémologiques importantes 
(celle de Leibniz et celle de Piaget). Dans la deuxième partie, je présente un exemple d’une perspective sémiotique éducative 
à l’aide d’un épisode de salle de classe.
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In the investigation of teaching-learning processes 
substantial attention has been paid to the written and 
oral registers. Recent studies suggest, however, that 
gestures, body posture, kinesthetic actions, artifacts 
and signs in general are a fruitful array of resources 
to be taken into account in order to investigate how 
students learn and how teachers teach (Arzarello, 
2006; Bautista & Roth, 2012; Forest & Mercier, 
2012; Radford, 2009; Radford, Edwards & Arzarello, 
2009). Instead of being mere epiphenomena 
surplus of teaching and learning, these resources, 
it is argued, mediate the teacher’s and the students’ 
classroom activity in substantial manners. Figure 1 
shows three Grade 11 students during a trigonometry 
lesson where they are devising a formula to describe 
the position P(x(t), y(t)) of a train that moves at a 
constant speed along a circular route. The student to 
the left measures time with a chronometer; following 
the train, the student in the middle indicates with 
inked signs the train’s position along the path of the 
train at different times; the student to the right coor-
dinates the other two students’ action and takes notes 
on a ield sheet.
It is in the investigation of the varied arrays of 
resources to which we resort in our daily life to think, 
signify and communicate, that semiotics may offer 
an interesting contribution to education. Semiotics, 
indeed, is concerned with signs of any kind and 
with the various modes in which humans signify. 
Semiotics, Eco (1988, p. 26) suggests, is devoted 
“to describe the functioning of communication and 
signiication.”
However, the contribution of semiotics to educa-
tion cannot be taken for granted. There is no such 
thing as a direct or unproblematic application of 
semiotics to education. In order to properly account 
for the educational problems we deal with —e.g., how 
teachers and students learn speciic contents, or how 
they use and become familiar with digital artifacts— 
the semiotic concepts to which we may resort have 
to be suitably integrated into theories of teaching and 
learning. A simple amalgamation of semiotics with 
learning theories would lead if not to failure then 
at least to limited success. We should not lose sight 
Figure 1. Grade 11 students investigating the equation of the point P(x(t), y(t))  
of a train that moves around a circle at constant speed.
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of the fact that the main semiotics systems were not 
devised to tackle educational problems. They were 
oriented to answer questions of a linguistic nature 
(e.g., Saussure (1916)) or appeared integrated in the 
development of general theories —e.g., a phenome-
nological theory of knowing (Peirce, 1958-1966); a 
phenomenological theory of consciousness (Husserl, 
1970); or a phenomenology of perception (Merleau-
Ponty, 1960)1.
If the amalgamation of semiotics and education 
does not seem to be the best option, how can these 
two disciplines be brought together? I do not think 
that, at this point in the development of educational 
research, a reasonable answer can be provided. 
What seems reasonable to assert, by contrast, is that 
because of the semiotic focus on signs and signiica-
tion, and the educational focus on knowing in parti-
cular contexts (e.g., classrooms, workplace, etc.), a 
semiotic approach to education rests unavoidably on 
assumptions that are made about the epistemic role of 
signs. In other words, the manner in which semiotics 
can contribute to education is mediated by the epis-
temological assumptions that underpin educational 
theories and the extent to which those assumptions 
can be cast in, and even be transformed by, semiotic 
concepts and constructs.
It is this idea that I intend to articulate in this 
article. In doing so, I hope to contribute to our unders-
tanding of the possibilities, limits, and challenges that 
semiotics offers to educational research. I start with 
a discussion about the cognitive role of signs in the 
work of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. Although Leibniz does not offer a semiotic 
approach to education, his theory of human unders-
tanding shows, in an interesting and clear way, that 
our recourse to signs in our attempts to account for 
the manner we come to know is, indeed, enmeshed 
in assumptions about knowledge and the structure 
of reality. In subsequent sections I shall deal with 
Piaget’s semiotics and contrast it with contemporary 
sociocultural trends. In the last section I present an 
example of a semiotic approach to education.
LEIBNIZ AND THE EPISTEMIC ROLE OF SIGNS
Against Medieval theories of signs, Renaissance 
semioticians argued that signs are not merely bound 
to the realm of logic. Signs, the Renaissance semio-
ticians contended, have a cognitive and epistemic 
dimension. As expressed by Portuguese Pedro 
Margallo, in his 1520 Logius utriusque scholia in divi 
Thomae subtilisque Duns doctrina ac nominalium, 
“signum est res faciens cogitare,” that is, “a sign is 
something that makes think” (quoted in Meier-
Oeser, 2011). Charles S. Peirce went even further and 
claimed, in Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, 
that we do not have the power of thinking without 
signs (Peirce, 1868). But what is the exact role of 
signs in what we think? 
This question is at the heart of Leibniz’ theory of 
signs. In his 1677 paper Dialogue on the connections 
between things and words, he invites us to consider 
whether we “can perform any [e.g., two- or three-
digit] arithmetical calculation without making use 
of any number-signs” (Leibniz, 1951, p. 8). What 
Leibniz had in mind, however, was much more 
than the idea of signs as mediators or facilitators of 
thought. Leibniz was fully aware of the fact that a 
cognitive discussion about signs must not dismiss the 
problem of the manner in which signs relate to ideas 
and things. In other words, for Leibniz you cannot 
turn to semiotics without making explicit your own 
epistemological and ontological principles. 
Leibniz’ semiotics rests on a view according to 
which there is a correspondence between language, 
thought, and the conceptual structure of reality. 
Indeed, Leibniz assumed that all existing things 
are amenable to representations that would relect 
their essence and convey their relationships to 
other things. The world, in other terms, lends itself 
to be expressed through signs. In What is an idea? 
(a paper written in 1676), he says: “there must be 
something in me which not only leads to the thing but 
also expresses it” (Leibniz, 1951, p. 281; italics in the 
original). In Leibniz’s view, there is an ontological 
commonality between the thing expressed and its 
semiotic expression. It is this very commonality that 
ensures the success of our inquisitive endeavours and 
that we come to know things:
the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, 
perspective drawing in a plane expresses a solid, a 
speech expresses opinions and truths, letters express 
numbers, an algebraic equation expresses a circle 
or some other figure; and it is because these means 
of expression have something in common with the 
conditions of the thing expressed and studied, that we 
can come to know the corresponding properties of the 
thing expressed. (Leibniz, 1951, p. 282)
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However, the harmonious correspondence 
between ordo rerum and ordo idearum that, in 
Leibniz’s view, semiotics realizes is haunted by difi-
culties. If Leibniz is one of the 17th century philo-
sophers who championed the idea that there is a 
link between the human capacity for language and 
the human capacity to understand reality, natural 
languages, according to him, are nonetheless far 
from relecting reality. Given the epistemological and 
ontological principles that he adopted—in particular 
the assumption that things and ideas have a common 
deep semiotic structure—he was led to believe that 
there should be a language that would overcome 
the deiciencies of natural languages. It should be 
possible, he thought, to ind a language with suitable 
deinitions to capture the essence of things; it should 
also be possible to ind the characters (i.e. signs) to 
represent things and their essence. These characters 
would allow the individual to obtain, in a transparent 
manner, the fundamental knowledge of the thing 
that they represent.
It is within this context that Leibniz envisioned a 
language whose signs or characters (and the combi-
nations of them) would result in clear thinking and 
a clear manipulation of syllogisms and judgements. 
This language is what he termed the universal charac-
teristic. As Rutherford puts it, 
the universal characteristic would enable us to 
construct linguistic characters which are transparent 
representations of intelligible thoughts, something the 
signs of natural languages typically fail to be, and to 
reduce logical reasoning to a mechanical procedure 
relying solely on the substitution of formal characters. 
(Rutherford, 1995, p. 225)
Considering mathematical signs as a kind of 
model, Leibniz endeavoured to find a method to 
assign characters or signs to our thoughts so that 
they would be combined or operated unambiguously 
as in arithmetic calculations or geometric proofs:
De la il est manifeste, que si l’on pouvoit trouver des 
caracteres ou signes propres à exprimer toutes nos pensées, 
aussi nettement et exactement que l’arithmetique exprime 
les nombres, ou que l’analyse geometrique [i.e., l’algèbre] 
exprime les lignes, on pourroit faire en toutes les matieres 
autant qu’elles sont sujettes au raisonnement tout ce qu’on 
peut faire en Arithmetique et en Geometrie. 
Car toutes les recherches qui dependent du raisonnement 
se feroient par la transposition de ces caracteres, et par une 
espece de calcul (Leibniz in Couturat, 1961, p. 155 ; italics 
in the original)2
It is within this context that Leibniz attempted to 
improve Euclid’s deinitions of fundamental geome-
trical objects (such as points and lines) and that he 
cast doubts about the potential of algebra to repre-
sent geometric objects and calculations, as Descartes 
did in his geometric investigations. As he put it in a 
letter to Huygens in 1675, 
Mr. Descartes … a donné une méthode de digérer par 
ordre les courbes et de les accommoder aux équations. Mais 
il ne s’y est pas pris de la manière la plus simple et la plus 
naturelle pour ce qui est de les accommoder aux équations. 
(Leibniz, 1995, p. 11)3
To sum up, Leibniz’s account of knowing rests on 
the assumption of a natural correspondence between 
knowledge, signs, and thought. It is within these 
assumptions that Leibniz envisioned the quest for 
a universal language or characteristic based on the 
model of a mathematical symbolism and its unen-
ding possibilities of substitution and formal trans-
formations. In a certain sense, Leibniz articulated 
a widespread cultural and intellectual view of the 
European 17th century. As Wiener (1951) notes in 
his Introduction to his Leibniz. Selections, although 
societal structures of Leibniz’s time remained 
supported by theological, legal and political tradi-
tions, “The development of more exact methods of 
measuring time, latitude and longitude, interest and 
insurance rates and new techniques of agriculture” 
conveyed a view in which mathematical reasoning 
and symbolism became highly regarded (p. xx). 
It is not surprising to ind Leibniz engaged in the 
search for an automation of human actions, such 
as the invention of adding machines for banks and 
ready-reckoners for commerce (Wiener, 1951). 
Leibniz appears hence as a truly modern thinker 
that offered a great insight into the complexities that 
underlie the relationships between signs, thought 
and reality. Although Leibniz’s epistemological and 
ontological commitments may be found controver-
sial or problematic today, his work help us to see 
that semiotics cannot be merely juxtaposed against 
a theory of knowing. Semiotics becomes ineluctably 
tied to epistemological and ontological assumptions 
ON SEMIOTICS AND EDUCATION
Luis Radford
189
of the theory by helping us to cast these assumptions 
through semiotic concepts and constructs.4 
PIAGET’S SEMIOTICS
With the development of new entrepreneurial 
forms of mercantile production and the expansion 
of commercial activity in the 17th and 18th centuries 
arose a new form of subjectivity that progressively 
asserted itself as the foundation of meaning and 
knowledge. While in medieval times to know some-
thing was to see it in God —considered as creator 
of everything existing and to come— from the 17th 
century on, as Arendt (1958) reminds us, to know 
something became increasingly equated with knowing 
the process of its formation. Fabrication became the 
metaphor of the new epistemological paradigm.
Such a shift was not accomplished easily. Leibniz 
was certainly well positioned to feel the tremen-
dous tension and signiicance of it. He attempted to 
reconcile the remnants of the old paradigm with the 
requirements of the new one, by arguing that the two 
views amounted to the same thing: to know some-
thing is to produce our own ideas and to see them 
in God: 
As to whether we see all things in God ... or whether 
all ideas are our own, we must realize that even if we do 
see all things in God, it is still necessary for the ideas 
through which we see to be our own at the same time; 
that is, our ideas are not little replicas, so to speak, but 
affections or modiications corresponding to what we 
perceive in God. (Leibniz, 1951, p. 289)
In Kant’s time, the secularization of knowledge 
progressed further and bit-by-bit knowledge became 
understood as that which the individuals produced 
on their own. For Kant, knowledge is something that 
the individual constructs. Thus, referring to mathe-
matics, he says:
mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by 
reason from the construction of concepts. To construct 
a concept means to exhibit a priori [i.e., prior to 
experience—LR] the intuition [or representation—LR] 
which corresponds to the concept. For the construction 
of a concept we therefore need a non-empirical 
intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single 
object, and yet none the less, as the construction of 
a concept (a universal representation), it must in its 
representation express universal validity for all possible 
intuitions which fall under the same concept. (Kant, 
A713/B741; 2003, p. 577)
This short passage of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason provides us with a neat window through 
which to observe the accomplishment of the shift 
Leibniz saw coming in his own time. By enquiring 
into the limits of human reason, Kant shook up the 
assumed belief of a harmonious correspondence 
between thought and reality. His emphasis on the 
subject as the doer of his or her own knowledge 
unveiled at the same time the boundaries of human 
initude and the limits of possible experience. The 
possibility of knowing the noumena or the things-
in-themselves was no longer ascertainable. There 
is, hence, a change at the ontological level. The 
ontological change does not diminish our possibi-
lity to know something. What Kant says is that, in 
our human endeavours, we do know, but what we 
end up knowing is not the noumena but rather the 
products of our own experience. In doing so, Kant 
adds a new ontological layer, where the individual 
lodges his/her own constructions. His ontology of 
things-in-themselves remains, as Rockmore (2011) 
notes, extremely traditional, Platonic in fact. What 
is truly innovative in Kant’s theory of knowing is his 
epistemology. Along with Giambattista Vico (2002), 
he articulates a view that remained in slow incuba-
tion for two centuries or so, namely a view of the 
individual at the center of the epistemological arena. 
And it is here that Piaget comes in. 
Indeed, in Piaget’s genetic epistemology, 
knowledge is theorized as something that emanates 
from the individual’s actions and is primarily 
produced by the individual itself. Annoyed by the 
excessive focus on language by the proponents 
of logical positivism—who, not really far from 
Leibniz’s views, considered the logic of human thin-
king susceptible to expression through a symbolic 
processual language—Piaget argued again and again 
that the origins of intelligence are not to be found, 
ontogenetically speaking, on the side of language, 
but on the side of sensory-motor actions. In a paper 
presented at a symposium in Neuchâtel, in 1962, he 
claimed that
L’un des fondateurs de cet « empirisme (ou positivisme) 
logique » , R. Carnap, a commencé par soutenir que la 
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logique entière ne consistait qu’en une syntaxe générale, 
au sens linguistique du terme. Dans la suite et en 
parallèle avec Tarski, il a été conduit à y adjoindre une 
« sémantique » générale, mais ceci ne nous fait pas non plus 
franchir les frontières du langage. Enin Morris a montré 
la nécessité (non d’ailleurs reconnue par l’Ecole entière), 
pour rendre compte du caractère opératif de la logique, de 
compléter la syntaxe et la sémantique logistiques par une 
« pragmatique », mais il s’agit, toujours encore, des règles 
de l’utilisation d’un langage et nullement d’une logique de 
l’action. (Piaget, 1972, p. 84)5
In the same paper, in articulating the question of 
the primacy of action over language, he reminds his 
readers that operations, insofar as they result from 
the interiorization of actions and their coordina-
tion, “remain relatively longtime independent from 
language” (1972, p. 88). A few years earlier, in his 
article Le langage et la pensée du point de vue génétique 
[Language and thought from a genetic viewpoint], 
Piaget had held the same view and asserted that 
Les operations + et − [c’est-à-dire d’associement et 
disassociemente] sont … des coordinations entre actions 
avant d’être transposes sous une forme verbale et ce n’est 
donc pas le langage qui est la cause de leur formation : 
le langage étand indéiniment leur pouvoir et leur confère 
ume mobilité et généralité qu’elles n’auraient pas sans 
lui, c’est entendu, mais il n’est point à la source de telles 
coordinations (Piaget, 1954, p. 55)6
This is how he answered a famous and profound 
question that he formulated several times during his 
career, namely whether or not language can consti-
tute a necessary condition to the achievement of the 
logical-mathematical operations without being none-
theless a suficient condition to their formation (e.g., 
Piaget, 1951, 1954, 1972,). 
To understand Piaget’s answer we have to bear 
in mind that language, in his account, can only be 
understood in its relationship to a semiotic instru-
ment that is ontogenetically contemporaneous to it 
(Piaget, 1954): the semiotic function, which Piaget 
deined as “the ability to represent something by a 
sign or a symbol or another object” (Piaget, 1970, 
p. 45). The semiotic function “commences when 
signifiers are differentiated from what is thereby 
signified and when signifiers can correspond to 
a multiplicity of things signified” (Piaget, 1980, 
p. 29,). It includes language but does not coincide 
with it: it also includes gestures, differed imitations, 
mental imagery, which he equated to interiorized 
imitation, symbolic play, and sign language (Piaget, 
1980 p. 28). For Piaget, language and the semiotic 
functions have irst of all a representational nature 
that operates at the level of things and the indivi-
dual’s actions. It is the semiotic function that is 
responsible for the transition from action to repre-
sentation (1980, p. 28). The sensorimotor signiiers 
are replaced with symbolic signifiers that signify 
things that are not necessarily present but evoked. 
From this representational conception of language 
and the semiotic function more generally, Piaget 
does not have any problem showing that thought 
precedes language. “We can conclude,” Piaget says, 
“that thought precedes language, and that language is 
limited to transform thought in helping it to attain its 
forms of equilibrium through a greater schematism 
and a more mobile abstraction” (Piaget, 1954, p. 54). 
Like in Leibniz’s case, Piaget presents us with an 
interesting example of how semiotics appears entan-
gled and underpinned by epistemological and onto-
logical premises. Drawing on Kant’s epistemology 
and giving up Kant’s aprioristic assumptions, Piaget 
elaborated a genetic epistemology where knowledge 
is constructed by the subject as a result of sensori-
motor actions that give rise to a symbolic function. 
This allows the subject to imitate his/her previous 
actions, which are now evocated through symbolic 
signiiers7. His genetic epistemology is one of the 
most celebrated achievements in psychology and 
epistemology. I would like to suggest that Piaget’s 
genetic epistemology is to the 20th century what 
Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain is 
to the 17th century. Yet, as we have previously seen, 
the Piagetian theoretical ediice rests on a limited 
conception of language and the semiotic function. 
For Piaget, semiotics more generally is of the order 
of representation and remains hence a referential 
mechanism of knowers and their actions.8 
In the next section I dwell on some contemporary 
trends where the human mind is considered to arise 
from language. Such a contrast will allow us, I hope, 
to have a better grasp of some of the intricate and 
complex relations between semiotics and theories 
of knowing and learning. Then, I shall deal more 
directly with semiotics and education.




In contrast to the Leibnizian conception of semio-
tics— a conception that, as we saw in Section 2, 
endows signs with a role of expressible mediators 
between the alleged harmonious structures of thought 
and reality— Piaget adopted a conception according 
to which a semiotic mechanism (the semiotic func-
tion) provides the individual with the elements to go 
beyond actual actions with objects in order to reach 
the level of conceptual schemes of relective abstrac-
tion. Signs acquire the status of signiiers of objects 
or actions. But what about the ontological dimension 
of the objects of knowledge? Rotman (1977) has 
discussed at length this dimension of Piaget’s genetic 
epistemology in his book Jean Piaget: psychologist 
of the real, and shows how Piaget adopts a form of 
biological realism. Here, I would like to refer to an 
interesting passage that comes from Piaget’s response 
to the comments that René Thom offered during the 
famous Piaget-Chomsky debate. In his comments, 
which deal with the question of the ontological status 
of space, Thom asked whether space is a subjective 
construction or something real, out there. “One of 
two things: either exterior space exists as such, as the 
universal framework in which all reality is localized 
... or it is constructed from non spatial elements” 
(Thom, 1980 p. 361). Piaget responded:
In regard to the concept of space Thom starts by 
offering an alternative which is precisely one I claim 
to have made obsolete: either a physical space outside 
or a construction of the subject. My answer is, on the 
contrary, that if mathematics is adapted to reality, 
it is because the subject, in his organic sources, is 
a physicochemical and spatial object, among others, 
and because, in the construction of his own cogni-
tive structures, he starts from neurological and biolo-
gical sources whose laws are those of reality. It is 
thus through primarily endogenous and not uniquely 
exogenous pathways that the space constructed by 
the subject its in with the outside space; therefore, 
both exist without conlict and converge without 
merging. (Piaget, 1980, p. 369)
This ontological assumption is what Glasersfeld 
calls Piaget’s “metaphysical realism” (Glasersfeld, 
1988, p. 27). 
In contemporary sociocultural trends (see e.g. 
Arzarello, 2006; Bartolini Bussi & Mariotti, 2008; 
Cantoral & Farfán, 1998) signs are often considered 
as mediators of thought without assuming none-
theless a Leibnizian pre-given relationship between 
the ontological structure of reality and the episte-
mological mechanisms that lead individuals to know 
this reality. Without dismissing the speciic biolo-
gical constitution of our species, there is no assump-
tion either of a “natural” itting between a reality 
out there and the subjective constructions of it. In a 
similar vein, in contemporary sociocultural trends, 
language is not empowered with the possibility of 
deciphering a world whose nature is supposed to be 
semiotic from the outset. Nor is language reduced 
to the semiotic role of producer of signiiers out of 
which the individual becomes capable of moving 
from the sensorimotor realm to a more abstract 
conceptual layer. In some contemporary sociocul-
tural trends, in particular those that identify them-
selves as discursive, language and discourse build 
reality in manners that are contingent, and histori-
cally and culturally situated.
At the cognitive level, one of the differences 
between these theoretical positions is the following. 
In the Leibnizian case, it is considered that, ontoge-
netically speaking, signs derive from a mind that 
in its cognitive endeavour tries to ind the correct 
signs to express itself. In the Piagetian case, signs 
derive from the constructive deeds of the subject 
and serve the purpose of bringing the individual’s 
actions to a higher cognitive level of hypothesis, 
propositional operations and structures. Language, 
as Piaget conceptualized it, is one of the semiotic 
mechanisms to which individuals resort to overcome 
the perceptual immediacy of the objects; through 
language and the semiotic function concrete objects 
become evoked objects that can now be handled 
in hypothetical situations. Even if language is also 
something inter-individual to be used in cooperation 
with others, for Piaget it remains overall an instru-
ment of abstraction. For sociocultural trends (e.g., 
Edwards, 1997), by contrast, cognition derives from 
culture. Although the theoretical articulations of how 
cognition actually derives from culture is thematized 
differently (e.g., as participation or as internaliza-
tion), sociocultural trends agree on the fact that it is 
misleading to understand the relationship between 
cognition and culture in causal terms. A causal 
reading of this complex relationship would lead us 
back to the Enlightenment mechanist model of scien-
tiic explanation that is at odds with the understan-
ding of culture as a continuous, dynamic, emergent 
movement of conlicting views and perspectives. 
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Within the large spectrum of sociocultural trends, 
communication comes to the fore. These trends 
understand language in a social and cultural way. 
Some of them argue that cognition arises out of acts 
of communication and is hence a social formation. 
For instance, Harré and Gillett (1994, p. 22) say that 
“[t]he idea that the mind is, in some sense, a social 
construction is true in that our concepts arise from 
our discourse and shape the way we think.” Sfard 
suggests that thinking can be deined as “the indi-
vidualized form of the activity of communicating” 
(Sfard, 2008, p. 174). In an explicit manner, this dei-
nition asserts that, ontogenetically speaking, cognitive 
processes are built on the basis of the social relations 
out of which our cognitive endeavours take place.
We see the tremendous difference between the 
Leibnizian, Piagetian, and the contemporary discur-
sive trends to signs and knowledge. The Leibnizian 
trend works under the Cartesian assumption that 
ideas are in us. This assumption does not amount to 
considering the human mind as a sort of container. 
“What I mean by an idea,” Leibniz says, “is not a 
certain act of thinking, but a power or faculty such 
that we have an idea of a thing even if we are not 
thinking about it but know that we can think it 
when the occasion arises.” (Leibniz, 1951, p. 281). 
Ideas are dormant in us as “the statue of Hercules is 
dormant in the rough marble” (p. 290) from which 
it will one day emerge. In Piagetian epistemology, 
ideas are not in us in the Leibnizian sense; they are 
constructed by the individual in the course of its 
ontogenetic development. In sociocultural research, 
ideas are neither in us nor constructed in the 
Piagetian sense: ontogenetically speaking, they are in 
culture, embedded in its various practices, and —like 
the practices in which they are embedded— they are 
always evolving. 
There is still another way to express the previous 
differences. Leibniz’s epistemology rests on a poten-
tially harmonious fitting of thought, reality, and 
language, whereby to know something is both to 
produce, or to account for, our own ideas and to see 
them in God. By contrast, Piaget’s work is embedded 
in the foundational project of modern epistemo-
logy, a project whose main characteristic is the 
dismissal of a transcendental dimension (dimension 
that still survives in Leibniz’s work in the form of 
God’s knowledge), and a concomitant emphasis on 
the individual’s actions as producers of knowledge. 
Different as they are, these epistemologies converge, 
although for unconnected reasons, in an identiica-
tion of subject and object: there is no fundamental 
gap in what is (the ontological) and the epistemolo-
gical (how we know it). Mind and things are cotermi-
nous. Sociocultural research re-introduces a trans-
cendental dimension. That is, sociocultural research 
starts from the premise of a cultural (material and 
ideal) reality that precedes the cognitive activity of 
the individual, and as such transcends the individual 
from the outset. This reality is not a Platonic one: it is 
an always evolving conlicting reality shaped by poli-
tical, economical, legal, ethical and other dimensions 
of everyday life. In other words, in contrast with 
modern epistemologies of which Piaget’s is arguably 
one of the best examples, sociocultural research 
starts from the non-identity of mind and things. 
Although the world that we come to inhabit at birth 
is a historical world made by humans, ontogeneti-
cally speaking, we are not automatically, by the event 
of our birth, in the world in a cultural sense. There 
is an ontological gap that we progressively cross in a 
lengthy march as we come to inhabit our culture —a 
march in the course of which we remain in a state 
of uninished and always changing selves, that is, 
in a state of becoming. If, hence, subject and object 
do not coincide, they are, as Adorno (1973) argues, 
mediated from the outset by cultural artifacts, as well 
as discursive and other practices.
We may appreciate better the difference between 
the epistemological systems sketched above if we 
return to the place that language and semiotics occupy 
therein. In sociocultural perspectives, culture and its 
various artifacts are continuously mediating subjects 
and objects. Language is the mediating cultural arti-
fact par excellence. It is ubiquitously affecting the 
subject from its birth. For Piaget, from an ontogenetic 
viewpoint, language intervenes when the child starts 
using it. Before that crucial moment, the child has to 
be imagined if not as epistemologically deaf then at 
least as indifferent to language, as if language would 
be something like the apathetic and lethargic conti-
nuous noise of water running in a river. 
AN EXAMPLE OF A SEMIOTICS APPROACH TO 
EDUCATION 
Let me now turn to a semiotic cultural approach 
to education on which some colleagues and I have 
been working for the past few years. The semiotic 
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approach to education that I would like to sketch 
draws on Hegel’s philosophy, chiely his account of 
mediation as a central part of the dialectic between 
the general and the particular. For Hegel (1977), 
the particular is not a mere instance of something 
general. For example, a particular triangle drawn 
on paper is not just a speciic case of the general or 
ideal form “triangle.” Between the general and the 
particular there is a dialectical relationship that has 
to be understood as mutually constitutive. The general 
is the particular’s mode of existence, which is what 
happens when we say that a speciic triangle is part 
of the general category “triangle.” Reciprocally, the 
particular is the mode of existence of the general. In 
this case, the speciic triangle is the speciic triangle 
itself (T=T), but is, at the same time, in its role of 
mediator, the mode of existence of the general. The 
same could be said of a poem, a musical composi-
tion, or a physical cultural performance—a dance, 
for example.
Bearing these remarks in mind, it turns out that 
knowledge is not only of the order of the general, for 
knowledge exists, and can only exist, in the form of 
concrete temporal-spatial processes enacted in acti-
vity rather than of impalpable things or products. 
This is why, within this perspective, knowledge (for 
instance mathematical knowledge) cannot exist in a 
kind of Platonic realm, detached from culture. Nor 
can it be reduced to its material dimension. In the 
same way as music does not exist in the score or in 
the violin, mathematics does not exist in rulers and 
compasses or in the dry written text of a theorem 
and its proof. A book or a written theorem is an arti-
fact, a trace of activity. For, again, mathematics (as 
a set of practices) and mathematical knowledge (as 
deined previously) exist in the form of activities, in 
performances. 
I can rephrase these ideas in other terms: In the 
ontology that underpins the semiotic approach to 
education that I am sketching, knowledge appears 
as an ensemble of culturally and historically consti-
tuted embodied processes of relection and action. 
In the case of arithmetic, those processes would be 
processes of reflection and action about quantity 
mediated by embodied forms of representation, as 
in the case of the Oksapmin investigated by Saxe 
(1982) or material forms of representation, as in 
the medieval abacus, etc. In the case of music, it 
would be processes of aesthetic and aural expression 
mediated by violins, pianos, etc.
In the epistemology that underpins the semiotic 
approach to education that I am describing, to know 
is to enact (through embodied and other types of 
signs and artifacts) cultural forms of action and 
reflection. To know is to make them present, to 
expand and to generalize them, and also to criticize 
and subvert them.
As we can see, semiotics is crucially embedded 
in the ontological and epistemological concepts of 
the semiotic approach to education that I have been 
sketching. Now, how does learning enter into this 
picture? Learning appears as follows. The students 
cannot necessarily discern the historical-cultural 
forms of action, reflection, and expression that 
constitute, for instance, projective geometry or 
algebra. Let me refer here to an example that comes 
from a Grade 2 class of 7–8-year-old students. The 
example is part of a lesson whose goal was to get 
the students acquainted with a historical-cultural 
form of relection and action that each one of us, as 
competent adults, recognize as algebraic — a cultural 
form of thinking that would easily lead us to genera-
lize the sequence shown in Figure 2 in order to ind, 
let’s say, the number of rectangles in Term 100, as 
well as a formula for Term n.
Figure 2. The irst terms of a sequence that Grade 2 students investigated in an algebra lesson. 
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When asked, mathematicians—and even adoles-
cents having some familiarity with algebra (Sabena, 
Radford, & Bardini, 2005)— often report that they 
“see” the figures as divided into two rows. Then, 
they generalize this property to all (visible and non-
visible) figures of the sequence, and easily come 
up with both a formula to calculate the rectangles 
in remote terms, such as Term 100 (see Figure 3a), 
and, although not without dificulties in the case of 
adolescents (Radford, 2003, 2010a), another formula, 
such as 2n+1, to calculate the number of rectangles 
in Term n (Figure 3b). 
For the trained eye, the terms are often reported as 
divided into two rows. 
For young students, however, discerning what 
we, as competent adults, could easily discern as alge-
braic is not necessarily easy. In fact, in our Grade 2 
class, when the students extended the sequence and 
drew Terms 5, 6 and 8, they produced answers like 
those shown in Figure 4.
It is here where learning comes into the picture. 
Learning, I suggest, is the social, embodied, and 
sign-mediated process of creatively and critically 
discerning and getting acquainted and conversant 
with historical, cultural forms of expression, action 
and relection. Learning hence rests on the following 
idea, already briefly mentioned before: At birth, 
we all enter a world that is not only populated by 
concrete objects but also by systems of thinking 
(mathematical, scientiic, aesthetic, ethical, juridical, 
etc.). Learning is the creative and critical encounter 
with those forms of thinking. Those encounters 
occur in what we call processes of objectiication.
It might be apparent now that in order to deine 
learning in this manner, I had first to talk about 
knowledge and knowing. What is knowledge? This 
is the ontological question. Knowledge, I suggested, 
is an ensemble of culturally and historically consti-
tuted embodied processes of relection and action. 
Examples of these processes are varied in and across 
cultures. They can be divinatory processes, as in the 
case of oracles in ancient Greece and in the African 
Azande’s methods described by Evans-Pritchard 
(1968); they can also be the reflective corpus of 
making sense of the universe through numbers as 
developed by the Pythagorean brotherhood or the 
rather self-contained contemporary theories of 
numbers, etc. What is knowing? This is the epistemo-
logical question. Knowing is the enactment of these 
Figure 3. 
Fig. 3a Fig. 3b
Figure 4. 
To the left, a student inishing drawing Term 6. In the middle, Terms 5 and 6. To the right, Term 8 according to another Grade 2 
student.
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culturally constituted forms of action and reflec-
tion. Knowledge and knowing mediate each other 
in the Hegelian sense. That is, one is the mode of 
existence of the other. Now, since this enactment in 
which knowing consists may not be apparent for the 
students, they learn it through processes of objecti-
ication—a term that acquires a speciic meaning in 
our approach and from which the approach borrows 
its name. Indeed, we call this approach the theory of 
objectiication (Radford, 2008, 2011). 
I deemed it necessary to spend some time trying 
to explain our concept of learning mainly because 
it differs from traditional concepts where learning 
is reduced to an assimilation of something already 
there. Our concept of knowledge as a process 
precludes this interpretation. If knowledge is a 
process, to learn and to know something can only be 
disclosed through our participation in those social 
practices that make knowledge available. It is only 
if you consider knowledge as a product that you 
can imagine that knowledge can be transmitted. 
For us, knowledge is not a product, but a process. 
Knowledge is action. 
Our concept of learning is also different from the 
one established by educational approaches inspired 
by Piaget’s epistemology. For the theory of objectii-
cation, knowledge is not something that our students 
construct. Knowledge exists before the students go 
to school. We think that the metaphor of learning as 
knowledge construction is in this sense misleading. 
It may be better, we suggest, to think of learning as 
something into which we come to participate. As 
such, it entails something old and something new. 
It is old in the sense that knowledge is historical and 
cultural. It precedes each one of us. It is new, for in 
each learning activity, it always appears differently. In 
other words, knowing —as the mode of existence of 
knowledge— is always particular. It is an event, and 
as such it is situated in time and space. It is unique. 
This is why the same teacher cannot “produce” the 
same lesson twice, exactly as the same music director 
cannot “produce” the same symphonic performance 
twice. The teacher, like the music director, in fact 
does not produce a performance. They participate in 
it. Knowing as event entails participation with others. 
Let me leave these theoretical considerations 
there and come back to my Grade 2 example. I 
would like to illustrate the process of objectiication 
in which the students engaged and out of which 
learning occurred. As will become apparent, in the 
account of learning semiotics is crucially present.
To become sensitive to cultural-historical alge-
braic forms of thinking about sequences like the one 
shown in Figure 2, the students were asked to extend 
the sequences up to Term 6. A subsequent question 
consisted in asking the students to decide whether 
the term shown in Figure 5 is Term 8 of the sequence. 
They were told that this term was drawn by Monique 
(an imaginary Grade 2 student); the students were 
encouraged to discuss in small groups.9 
Figure 5. 
The students were requested to discuss whether Monique’s 
term is Term 8 of the given sequence
Let me focus on the discussion that a group of 
students had with the teacher—a group formed by 
James, Sandra and Carla. When the teacher came 
to see the students’ work they had already worked 
for about 32 minutes together. They had finished 
drawing Terms 5 and 6, tried (unsuccessfully) to 
ind the number of rectangles in Term 12 and 25, 
and answered the question about Term 8 (which 
they considered to be Term 8 of the sequence). The 
teacher engaged in collaborative actions to create the 
conditions of possibility for the students to perceive 
a general structure behind the sequence. In order to 
do so, the teacher engaged the students in a counting 
strategy that involved Terms 1 to 4 (drawn on the irst 
page of the activity sheet) and that would be gene-
ralized to Term 8. Term 8 of the sequence was not 
materially present. Monique’s drawing was in the next 
page of the activity sheet. Here is the irst excerpt:
• Teacher: We will just look at the rectangles that 
are on the bottom (while saying this, the teacher 
makes three consecutive sliding gestures, each one 
going from bottom row of Term 1 to bottom row of 
Term 4; Pics 1-2 in Fig. 6 show the beginning and 
end of the irst sliding gesture). Only the ones on 
the bottom. Not the ones that are on the top. In 
Term 1 (she points with her two index ingers to 
the bottom row of Term 1; see Pic. 3), how many 
[rectangles] are there?
• Students: 1!
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• Teacher: (Pointing with her two-inger indexical 
gesture to the bottom row of Term 2) Term 2?
• Students: 2! (James points to the bottom row of 
Term 2; see Pic 4).
• Teacher: (Pointing with her two-inger indexical 
gesture to the bottom row of Term 3) Term 3?
• Students: 3!
• Teacher: (Pointing with her two-inger indexical 
gesture to the bottom row of Term 4; see Pic 5) 
Term 4?
• Students: 4!
• Teacher: (Making a short pause and breaking the 
rhythmic count of the previous terms, as if starting 
a new theme in the counting process, she moves 
the hand far away from Term 4 and points with 
Figure 6. 
The teacher’s and students’ sensuous (perceptual, gestural, tactile, aural, vocal) engagement in the task.
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a two-inger indexical gesture to the place where 
hypothetically one would expect to ind Term 8; 
see Pic 6.) How many rectangles would Term 8 
have on the bottom?
• Sandra: (hesitantly, after a relatively long pause) 4?
In Line 1, the teacher makes three sliding 
gestures to emphasize the fact that they will count 
the bottom row of the four given terms. Then, in the 
following lines, she starts a joint counting process 
suggesting a cultural form of perceiving the terms of 
the sequence—one in which the mathematical ideas 
of variable and relationship between variables are 
emphasized. Since Term 8 is not there, the teacher 
pretends that Term 8 is on the empty space of the 
sheet, somewhere to the right of Term 4. She points 
to the empty space, as she pointed to the other terms, 
to help the students imagine the term under consi-
deration. Yet, as Line 10 intimates, the passage from 
Term 4 to Term 8 was not successful. The objecti-
ication of the manner in which sequences can be 
algebraically perceived has not yet occurred. The 
teacher hence decided to restart the process, with 
some important modiications. Indeed, during the 
second attempt, the teacher does not go from Term 4 
to Term 8; this time she counts on the visible Terms 
1 to 4 and includes then Terms 5 to 8, which have to 
be imagined by the students with the help of gestures 
and words: 
• Teacher: We will do it again...
• Teacher: (Pointing to Term 1 with a two-inger 
indexical gesture) Term 1, has how many?
• Carla: (Pointing with her pen to the bottom row) 
1, (without talking to the teacher points to Term 
2 with a two-inger indexical gesture; Carla points 
with her pen to the bottom row of Term 2) 2, 
(again without talking the teacher points to Term 
3 with a two-inger indexical gesture; Carla points 
with her pen to the bottom row of Term 3), 3, 
(same as above) 4, (now moving to the hypotheti-
cal place of Term 5 and doing as above) 5.
• Teacher: Now it’s Term 8! (The teacher comes back 
to Term 1. She points again with a two-inger indexi-
cal gesture to the bottom row of Term 1) Term 1, has 
how many [rectangles] on the bottom?
• Students: 1.
• Teacher: (Pointing with a two-finger indexical 
gesture to the bottom row of Term 2) Term 2?
• Students: 2!
• Teacher: (Pointing with a two-finger indexical 
gesture to the bottom row of Term 3) Term 3?
• Students: 3!
• Teacher: (Pointing with a two-finger indexical 
gesture to the hypothetical place where bottom 
row of Term 4 would be) Term 4?
• Students: 4!
• Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 6?
• Students: 6!
• Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 7?
• Students: 7!
• Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 8?
• Students: 8!
• Sandra: There would be 8 on the bottom!
The teacher and the students went to page 2 of 
the activity sheet and counted together the rectangles 
on the bottom row of Monique’s term and realized 
that the number was indeed 8. At this point the 
relationship between variables started becoming 
apparent for the students. The relationship became 
objectiied. The teacher then moved to a joint process 
of counting the rectangles on the top row:
• Teacher : Very, very good. Now, we will verify if 
Monique has the good amount [of rectangles] 
on top. We will just look at the top… (like in the 
previous episode, she makes two sliding gestures, but 
this time pointing to the top row ; see Figure 7, pic 1). 
Term 1 has how many ?
• Students : 2 !
• Teacher : Term 2 ?
• Students : 3 ! . . .
• Teacher : Term 3 ?
• Students : 4 !
• Teacher : Term 4 ?
• Students : 5 ! (see Pic 2)
• Teacher : Term 6 ?
• James : 7
• Teacher : (Repeating) 7 … Bravo ! Term 8, will have 
how many ?
• Students : 9 !
• Teacher  : Ok. Oh  ! Excellent. Are there 9 
[rectangles] here (pointing to Monique’s term) ?
• Sandra : Yes, there are 9.
• Teacher : We will count it together.
• Students : (After turning the page where Monique’s 
term is, the teacher points orderly and rhythmically 
to the rectangles one after the other, while Sandra 
says) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8… ! ? (long pause following 
a general surprise. See Pics 3 and 4 in Figure 7).
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The students were perplexed to see that, contrary 
to what they believed, Monique’s Term 8 did not 
fit into the sequence. Here the activity reached a 
tension. Pic 4 in Figure 8 shows Sandra’s surprise. 
The students and the teacher remained silent for 2.5 
seconds, that is to say, for a lapse of time that was 21 
times longer than the average elapsed time between 
uttered words that proceeded the moment of surprise 
(for details of this poetic moment in the teacher-
students’ objectiication process, see Radford, 2010b).
Later on in the lesson the students were able to 
quickly answer questions about remote terms, such 
as Term 12 and Term 25, which were not percep-
tually accessible. They reined the manner in which 
the terms of the sequence could be perceived. The 
number of rectangles on the bottom row was equated 
to the number of the term in the sequence, while the 
number of rectangles on the top row was equated 
to the number of the term plus one (identiied as 
the dark rectangle in the corner). Here is an excerpt 
from the dialogue of Sandra’s group as they discuss 
without the teacher:
• Sandra : (Referring to Term 12) 12 plus 12, plus 1.
• Carla : (Using a calculator) 12 plus 12 … plus 1 
equal to …
• James : (Interrupting) 25.
• Sandra : Yeah ! 
• Carla : (looking at the calculator) 25 !
At this point, the target cultural knowledge has 
been objectiied. The students no longer need to see 
the terms of the sequence to determine the number 
of rectangles in it. A formula (a counting procedure) 
is now available. And, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Radford, 2010b), even if this formula does not 
contain letters, it is algebraic in nature: it is rather a 
formula-in-action (to rephrase Vergnaud). Through 
this formula the students can now ascertain the 
calculations they need to carry out to determine the 
number of rectangles in any particular term of the 
sequence (e.g., For Term 12: 12 plus 12, plus 1). 
Figure 7.
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As the transcripts suggest, the objectiication was 
accomplished through an intense interplay between 
various sensorial modalities and different signs. 
These embodied modalities and signs are epistemo-
logically fundamental in making the general appear 
through the particular, or to say it otherwise, to make 
the event (i.e., the teacher-students’ joint activity) 
the mode of existence of the general—its incarnation, 
so to speak. While in Leibniz’s semiotics, the senses 
and the signs as tangible entities cannot be consi-
dered as a fundamental part of cognition, for the 
theory of objectiication the embodied and material 
dimension of activity is unquestionably central. As 
Leibniz reasoned, “necessary truths such as found in 
pure mathematics, and particularly in arithmetic and 
in geometry, must have principles whose proof does 
not depend upon examples, nor consequently upon 
the testimony of the senses” (Leibniz, 1949, p. 44). 
For Leibniz the concrete examples that necessarily 
appear in material form and are grasped through our 
senses may be required to awake (réveiller) the prin-
ciples and theories that are already dormant in our 
soul (Leibniz, 1887, p. 34). The material world that 
we grasp in a sensuous manner cannot be considered 
as part of knowledge itself. For knowledge, in the 
rationalist camp, is of the order of reason and logic 
alone. For the theory of objectiication, by contrast, 
the bodily materiality of our actions are conditions of 
the existence of knowledge. Without the former the 
latter cannot exist.
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article seeks to contribute to current discus-
sions about semiotics and education. A “semiotic 
approach” to education, that is an educational 
approach that draws from semiotics, I argued, cannot 
consist of simply the amalgamation of a semiotic 
theory and an educational one. A semiotic approach 
to education is bound to the manner in which its 
epistemological and ontological assumptions are cast 
in, and even transformed by, semiotic concepts and 
constructs. To support my claim, I discussed, to a 
certain extent, Leibniz’s view of semiotics. His theory 
of human understanding shows how the manner we 
come to know is intimately related to our resorting to 
signs and to assumptions about the ontological and 
epistemological structure of reality (i.e., what reality 
is, and how we come to know it). Then, I briefly 
discussed the role that Piaget ascribed to semio-
tics in his genetic epistemology; I made an effort 
to show that Piaget’s semiotics is inscribed in the 
epistemological tradition of the modern era where 
transcendentalism is bracketed and the emphasis 
is put on the subject (Radford, 2012). I suggested 
that, without discarding the intersubjective nature of 
language, in his experimental analyses, Piaget ended 
up conceiving of language as a mere instrument of 
representation of actions, and objects of actions. 
This might have been the price to pay in order to 
keep his genetic epistemology coherent. Be that as 
it may, the subsequent brief allusion to contempo-
rary sociocultural trends seemed to me appropriate 
in order to convey an idea of alternative ways in 
which to theorize the role of signs and artifacts in 
knowledge and knowing. The allusion to sociocul-
tural trends was an occasion to bring forward one 
striking difference between modern and cultural 
epistemologies. Briely stated, the difference consists 
in how, ontogenetically speaking, the epistemologies 
of modernity emphasize the individual as the source 
of meanings and signiications. Sociocultural trends, 
by contrast, find such a source in culture and its 
practices.10 The last part of the paper was devoted 
to offer an example of a semiotic approach to educa-
tion—the theory of knowledge objectiication. By no 
means is this approach paradigmatic of the various 
contemporary trends in mathematics education, let 
alone of education as a whole. The interested reader 
is encouraged to refer to some recent work in this 
area.11 The theory of objectiication draws from the 
Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky line of thinking and suggests 
an alternative way in which to conceive of knowledge 
and knowing. Endorsing a dialectic dynamic between 
ontology and epistemology, knowledge is considered 
as an ensemble of culturally and historically consti-
tuted embodied processes of relection and action; 
knowing is the embodied, and material semiotic 
enactment of such processes. Now, since for the 
students the culturally and historically constituted 
embodied processes of reflection and action may 
not be apparent, the classroom activity (considered 
as a teacher-students joint process) moves towards 
their objectiication. If objectiication in general is to 
become aware or conscious of something (Radford, 
2002), objectification in classroom teaching-and-
learning activity occurs in that (stretched) moment 
when the object of knowledge appears refracted in 
the participant’s consciousness. Although the teacher 
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in the Grade 2 example knew very well before the 
classroom activity started that Monique’s term was 
not Term 8 of the given sequence, in the example 
here discussed, the objectiication required the event 
of the refraction of this fact both in the teacher’s 
consciousness and in the students’. For objectiica-
tion is a central part of the event or performance of 
the Hegelian “particular” in which the students and 
the teacher are engaged. As part of an event, objectii-
cation is always old and new. It is old in that it points 
to a historical form of thinking about patterns that 
can be found in the mathematical inquiries about 
igural numbers in ancient Greece. It is as new as the 
always particular, contextual, and situated—in short 
unique— aesthetic experience of each symphonic 
performance.
Through the example, it is possible to appreciate 
the various semiotic resources that mediate learning. 
Thus, at the beginning of the irst excerpt, the teacher 
makes many gestures; through some gestures, she 
points to terms that are perceptually available (Terms 
1-4). We can call these indexical gestures, gestures ad 
oculos to distinguish them from the gestures where 
what is pointed at is not there, in front of the eyes, 
but has to be imagined. We can call these indexical 
gestures at phantasma. But there is more. The teacher 
did not gesture silently. Gestures were coordinated 
with utterances. More precisely, the teacher coor-
dinated eye, hand, and speech through a series of 
organized simultaneous actions that oriented the 
students’ perception and emergent understanding of 
the target mathematical ideas.
The recourse to semiotics, as it appears in the 
interpretative account of the Grade 2 example, makes 
sense only within the context of the epistemolo-
gical and ontological assumptions that I discussed 
previously. Naturally, other assumptions may lead to 
a different recourse to semiotics and other accounts 
of learning. Semiotics cannot be merely juxtaposed 
with educational theories, but it can help to enrich 
them, or so I hope.
NOTES
1. Vygotsky’s work is a remarkable exception. Vygotsky’s 
educational and psychological work is certainly entangled 
in semiotic constructs (e.g. Vygotsky, 1981, 1997).
2. “It is obvious that if we could ind characters or signs 
suitable for expressing all our thoughts as clearly and 
exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometrical 
analysis [i.e., algebra] expresses lines, we could do in all 
matters insofar as they are subject to reasoning all that 
we can do in arithmetic and geometry. For all investiga-
tions which depend on reasoning would be carried out by 
the transposition of these characters and by a species of 
calculus.” 
3. A concise translation would be as follows: “Mr. Descartes 
…has igured out a method to deal with curves and to put 
them into equations. But he has not proceeded according 
to the simplest and most natural manner.” 
4. A similar outcome would be obtained if, instead of inves-
tigating Leibniz’s work, I would have focused on Peirce’s or 
Husserl’s work (see, e.g. Radford, 2006).
5. “One of the founders of this logical empiricism (or posi-
tivism), R. Carnap, started by claiming that the entire logic 
was nothing more than a general syntax, in the linguistic 
sense of the term. In this way, and in parallel with Tarski, 
he was led to add a general semantics; but this does not 
allow us to go beyond the boundaries of language. Then, 
in order to give an account of the operative character of 
logic, Morris showed the need (not entirely acknowledged 
by the whole school of thought [i.e., logical positivism]), 
to complete the syntax and the semantics of logic with a 
‘pragmatics.’ However, this is again to determine the rules 
behind the use of language and not at all those of a logic 
of action.”
6. Associative and dissociative operations are coordination 
of actions that take place before they are transformed into 
a verbal form; language is not hence the cause of their 
formation. Of course, language extends indeinitely their 
power and endows them with a mobility and generality 
that they otherwise would not have. But it [language] is 
not the source of such a coordination.
7. Piaget gives a nice example of the imitation of one’s 
actions and the symbolic play that the actions acquire in 
his 1954 paper (see Piaget, 1954, p. 52). 
8.  This is why it is misleading to see the difference 
between Piaget and Vygotsky as a question of emphasis on 
language. One of the differences is precisely in the concep-
tion of language, and signs more generally.
9. The trained eye would not have dificulty noticing the 
missing white rectangle on the top row. The untrained 
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eye, by contrast, may be satisied with the apparent spatial 
resemblance of these terms with the other terms of the 
sequence and might consequently fail to note the missing 
rectangle.
10.  Of course, the distinction that I am trying to make 
does not amount to saying that the sociocultural realm is 
not taken into account in the epistemologies of modernity, 
and in Piaget’s genetic epistemology, in particular (see, 
e.g., Nicolopoulou and Weintraub, 2009); nor am I saying 
that sociocultural theories do not take into account the 
subject or that the subject is reduced to a simple outcome 
of cultural production—see, e.g., the discussions about 
the concept of self in Mikhailov ( 1980), or more recently 
in Stetsenko and Arievitch (2004) or Roth and Radford 
(2011).
11.  A partial (chronological) list includes the following 
items (full bibliographical details can be found in the 
Reference section):The book Sémoisis et pensée humaine of 
R. Duval, published in 1995.
• The book Educational Perspectives on Mathematics as 
Semiosis: From Thinking to Interpreting to Knowing, 
edited by Anderson, Sáenz-Ludlow, Zellweger, and 
Cifarelli, in 2003.
• The book Activity and Sign: Grounding Mathematics 
Education, edited by Hoffmann, Lenhard and Seeger 
in 2005.
• The Special Issue of Educational Studies in 
Mathematics Semiotic perspectives on epistemology and 
teaching and learning of mathematics edited by Sáenz- 
Ludlow and Presmeg in 2006.
• The Special Issue of Relime Semiotics, Culture 
and Mathemtical Thinking, edited by Radford and 
D’Amore in 2006 (http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/
revista?codigo=7978).
• The book Semiotics in mathematics education: 
Epistemology, history, classroom, and culture, edited 
by Radford, Schubring, and Seeger, in 2008.
• The book Mathematical representations at the inter-
face of the body and culture, edited by W. -M. Roth 
in 2009.
• The book Semiotics education experience, edited by I. 
Semetsky in 2010.
• The Special Issue of Educational Studies in 
Mathematics Signifying and Meaning-Making in 
Mathematics Thinking, Teaching and Learning: Semiotic 
Perspectives, edited by Radford, Schubring, and 
Seeger, in 2011.
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